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The California Legislature Steers the
Antitrust Cart Right Off the Illinois
Brick Road
California traditionally has harmonized interpretations of its own
antitrust statutes with federal interpretations of the Sherman-Clayton
antitrust acts.' The California Legislature sounded a discordant note
in 19782 by removing the standing restrictions recently imposed upon
federal antitrust plaintiffs by the United States Supreme Court. The
new state law provides for broader standing than that allowed in federal courts but fails to posit solutions to the problems that prompted the
imposition of limitations on standing by the High Court. 4 This comment will examine the current status of the standing requirement in
antitrust actions and suggest methods of handling the procedural
nightmare envisioned by critics of the liberal standing provisions of
California.
The United States Supreme Court articulated the problems of broad
standing in antitrust cases in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.5 The Court
stated that remote purchaser standing in antitrust cases forced courts to
unravel an unmanageable tangle of evidentiary issues concerning the
incidence of damages which are sustained at various points in the chain
of distribution. In addition, the inclusion of the numerous commercial
entities which may be affected by an antitrust violation was viewed as a
procedurally staggering enterprise. This comment will suggest solutions to deal with standing problems which, though ostensibly laid to
rest by the United States Supreme Court in federal cases, have been
resurrected by the State of California in state cases. These solutions
will include substantive methods of proof aimed at tracing the impact
of damages along the chain of distribution. Procedural devices will
also be suggested to facilitate complete adjudication of the rights and
liabilities of all affected parties. The desirability of either broad or nar1. See Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, 4 Cal. 3d 842, 852-53, 484 P.2d
953, 959, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 791 (1971); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Financial Corp., 69 Cal.
2d 305, 315, 444 P.2d 481, 487, 70 Cal. Rptr. 849, 855 (1968).
2. CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 536, § - at -. The United States Congress is currently considering

legislation that would statutorily overrule these restrictions. For an extensive discussion of this
legislation, see Comment, Congressional Authorization of Indirect Purchaser Treble Damage
Claims. The Illinois Brick Wall Crumbles, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1979).
3. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
4. Compare id. at 729-48 with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a). See also 10 PAC. L.J.,
REVIEW OF SELECTED 1978 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 299 (1979).

5. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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row standing, as perceived from a policy viewpoint, will not be the concern of this comment since adequate consideration of the policy
arguments surrounding the desirability question may be found elsewhere.6 Appreciation of the problems presented to California by broad
standing will be furthered by an examination of the background of the
standing issue.
THE

A.

STANDING CLIMATE

Goals of Treble DamageActions

The first years of this century witnessed the continued expansion of
corporate industrial power and the attendant impact on the American
people. In an effort to shield the public from abuses of such power,
state and federal governments enacted antitrust laws aimed at preserving a competitive environment.7 These laws generally provide for a
dual scheme of enforcement against anti-competitive acts. Criminal
antitrust actions are authorized 8, but private civil actions, brought by
those injured by violations of the antitrust laws, are intended to provide
the major sanction against restraints of trade.9 The concomitant authorization of treble damage awards to successful private plaintiffs 0 is
essential to the efficacy of civil enforcement in two ways. First, substantial civil damage awards pose a greater threat to violators than do
criminal sanctions 1 and provide the needed incentive to offset the staggering demands prosecution of a civil antitrust suit places upon the
6. See, eg., Comment, Antitrust: The Offensive Use ofPassingOn, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 375
(1978); Comment, Illinois Brick and ConsumerActionr: The PassingOver of the Passing On Doctrine, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 361 (1978).
7. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 13 (Clayton Act); Conference of Studio
Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951); Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters of
the Pac., 29 Cal. 2d 34, 44, 172 P.2d 867, 873 (1946).
8. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16755 (authorizing fine of $1,000,000 for corporations, $100,000 for individuals and/or 3 year prison term) with 15 U.S.C. § 1 (identical provisions).
9. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 411 F.2d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 1969); Milton v. Hudson Sales Corp., 152 Cal. App. 2d 418, 443, 313 P.2d 936, 952 (1957).
10. Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 which provides:
Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden or
declared unlawful by this chapter, may sue therefor in any court having jurisdiction in
the county where the defendant resides or is found, or any agent resides or is found, or
where service may be obtained, without respect to the amount in controversy, and to
recover three times the damages sustained by him, and shall be awarded a reasonable
attorneys fee together with the costs of the suit.
with 15 U.S.C. 15 (1976) which provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
11. Cf. S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1977). See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
CASES, NOTES AND OTHER ECONOMIC MATERIALS 110 (1974) (suggesting that criminal sanctions
do iot deter violators to any significant extent); A. NEALE, ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED
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plaintiff's resources.12 In addition to ensuring vigorous private enforcefunction as a guarantee of comment, treble damages serve a second
13
pensation for the plaintiff's injury.
B.

Limitations on Access to the Treble Damage Action

Literal interpretation of both the federal Clayton Act and the California Cartwright Act would suggest that private treble damage actions
may be brought by anyone who is, in the words of the statutes, "injured
in his business or property."'14 Theoretically, an antitrust violation injures society as a whole, 5 so a literal interpretation of the statutory
language would allow suits by an unmanageable number of individuals, each claiming their share of the social harm. It has been necessary,
limitherefore, to develop standing restrictions that place a meaningful
16
tation on the availability of legal recourse for such violations.
Until 1977, federal standing requirements varied according to the
circuit in which suit was initiated.' 7 Courts generally applied variations of one of two tests. The earlier test, analogous to the tort doctrine
of proximate cause, sought to determine whether the violation had
been a direct cause of injury and thus conferred standing upon the
plaintiff, or whether the violation had indirectly harmed him and thus
left him without a legal remedy. 8 The alternative to this direct injury
test was the target area test, which addressed the issue of whether the
injury occurred in the area of the economy that the antitrust laws were
designed to protect.I'
STATES OF AMERICA 396 (4th Ed. 1970) (indicating that treble damage fear is a potent influence
on business decisions).
12. Cf.2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 318 at 84 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 232 (1976); 16N J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION § 110.01 [1] (1978).

13. Brenner v. Texas Co., 140 F. Supp. 240, 242-43, (N.D. Cal. 1956); Speegle v. Board of
Fire Underwriters of the Pac., 29 Cal. 2d 34, 46, 172 P.2d 867, 874 (1946).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a); see In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir. 1973).
15. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT,THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-7 (1976); see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, NOTES AND OTHER ECONOMIC MATERIALS 149
(1974); R. WARREN, ANTITRUST IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 47 (1973) (indicating primacy of consumer interest in antitrust philosophy); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365
(9th Cir. 1955).
16. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251,260-64 (1972) (observing that
Congress did not intend to extend recovery to all injured parties).

17. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 258-61
(1975); see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, NOTES, AND OTHER ECONOMIC MATERIALS 149
(1974); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir. 1973).
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth-Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers, 315 F.2d 564, 566-67, (7th Cir.
1963); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910); Shasta Douglas Oil Co. v. Work,
212 Cal. App. 2d 618, 625, 28 Cal. Rptr. 190, 195 (1963).
19. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir. 1973); 20th Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 211 (9th Cir. 1964).
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One factual setting in which the standing issue frequently arises involves an antitrust violation by a manufacturer or wholesaler and the
subsequent suit by a remote purchaser in a chain of distribution who
was injured when an overcharge caused by a violation was "passed on"
down the chain to that remote purchaser. 20 A hypothetical model will
be employed to facilitate understanding of the situations discussed in
this comment. Consider a simple economic subsystem, in which Monolithic Sugar, Inc., a sugar manufacturer, sells sugar to Compliant Distribution, Inc., a wholesaler, which in turn sells the sugar to the
Hypoglize Confectionery, which makes and retails candy. Suppose
Monolithic and some other sugar manufacturers conspire to set a minimum price at which to sell sugar, a price determined not by the forces
of the market, but by the agreement of the parties to the conspiracy. As
a result of this illegal conspiracy, Compliant must pay a higher price
for the sugar it wholesales, and having paid the higher price, must either absorb the loss or compensate by charging Hypoglize more for the
sugar it buys. Assuming it does charge Hypoglize more, Hypoglize
finds itself in the position Compliant just escaped, and must decide
whether to absorb the new higher price, or, like Compliant, pass on the
higher price to local candy consumers. In this hypothetical, Compliant
represents the sort of entity referred to as a "direct purchaser." Anyone
to whom Compliant sells, including Hypoglize and the local candy consumers, would be, with respect to Monolithic, an "indirect" or "remote" purchaser. The interrelationship of Monolithic, Compliant, Hypoglize, and the local consumers exemplifies what will be termed a
"chain of distribution." This comment will center around whether, and
by what means parties like Hypoglize and the local consumers can recover from Monolithic for the overcharge.
The Supreme Court's first definitive assessment of the pass-on concept did not consider aplaintfsclaim of passed-on injury as a basis of
standing. Instead, in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machine Corp.,21
the Court ruled on the validity of a pass-on argument raised by a defendant in an effort to block recovery by a direct purchaser-plaintiff.
Hanover Shoe involved a suit brought by a shoe manufacturer against
a corporation that leased shoe manufacturing equipment. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant's insistence on leasing equipment, to the total exclusion of the plaintiff's attempts to purchase the equipment,
placed an illegal restraint on trade and increased the plaintiff's manu20. Since 1960 more than half ofall Section 4 private treble damage suits (under the Clayton
Act) involved indirect purchasers, and over one-fourth of these actions involved ony indirect
purchasers. S. REP. No. 934, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 19-20 (1977).
21. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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facturing costs. 22 The defense argued that the plaintiff had distributed
its increased costs among its customers by charging more for its product, thereby passing on the injurious overcharge.23 This defense was
rejected by the Court in its holding that a legally cognizable injury was
24
sustained by the plaintiff, who had dealt directly with the defendant.
The holding in HanoverShoe provided the foundation for the standing restrictions imposed on plaintiffs by the Court's 1977 decision in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.5 In this case, manufacturers of building
materials had conspired to fix the prices of concrete blocks which, after
passing through the chain of distribution, were included in bid schedules on certain public contracts. The Court in Illinois Brick reiterated
its holding in Hanover Shoe that a violator may not escape liability by
asserting that the injury has been passed on since injury, in a legal
sense, could not be passed on.26 This reasoning was extended so that a
violator could not be subjected to liability by a plaintiff who claimed
injury from the passed-on effects of the violation. Thus, the Court in
effect 27 denied standing to remote purchasers in most antitrust contexts.28 The decision to deny standing to remote purchasers was motivated by policy considerations that transcended the obvious desire for
logical consistency between the defensive and offensive use of the passon theory. The implications of these policy considerations for California must be considered in light of California's new broad provision of
standing.
C. Caifornia'sResponse to IllinoisBrick
California courts regard federal antitrust case law as persuasive in
interpreting California statutes analogous to the Sherman-Clayton
Acts. 29 Thus the holding in IllinoisBrick could have placed an obstacle
in the path of remote purchasers seeking recovery under the Cartwright
Act for antitrust violations that indirectly injured them. This obstacle
was statutorily lifted with the amendment of the Business and Professions Code3" that provides a liberal standing requirement. As a result,
the Cartwright Act now allows anyone injured by a violation of the Act
to bring suit, regardless of whether he sustained injury while dealing
22. Id. at 483-84.
23. Id. at 487-88.

24. Id. at 494.
25. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
26. Id. at 728-29.

27. See notes 36-41 & accompanying text infra.
28. The Court distinguishes the cost-plus contract situation and alludes to an exception
where the direct purchaser is a subsidiary of the violator. 431 U.S. at 736, 736 n.16.
29. See note 1 rupra.
30. CAL. STATs. 1978, c. 536, § -, at-.
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directly or indirectly with the defendant. 31 Review of the substance of
this change must be predicated on certain constitutional considerations.
California's rejection of the Illinois Brick standing limitation raises
two constitutional issues. The first issue is preemption, specifically,
whether the adoption of broader standing by California is constitutionally invalid on the basis of federal supremacy in the regulation of commerce. In the absence of a clear intent by Congress to occupy
exclusively a given field of regulation, the states retain regulatory
power over the intrastate aspect of an activity, even though the regulation may affect interstate commerce. 2
The preemption inquiry turns on the existence of conflict between
federal and state schemes,33 but the California Supreme Court has held
that in the field of antitrust law, federal and state schemes are complementary, not conflicting.34 With specific regard to the discrepancy be-

tween the Illinois Brick limitation of federal antitrust standing and the
Cartwright Act's broader standing provisions, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals recognized in a recent case the viability of California antitrust action, thus implying that preemption was not a problem. 31 It is
most likely, therefore, that the new amendment will not fall to preemption.
An attendant constitutional issue concerns the right of a state legislature to extend standing to those denied it by the United States Supreme
Court. Commentators consistently refer to Illinois Brick as a standing
limitation case, for indeed its effect was to deny access to federal courts
by certain types of plaintiffs.36 Whispering against the gale, Justice
White, on behalf of the majority, observed, "[w]e do not address the
standing issue." 37 The Court was technically determining the incidence
of legally cognizable injury.38 In spite of Justice White's disclaimer,
31. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a).
32. See Huron-Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960).
33. R. E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657-58, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585,

587-88 (1974).
34. Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Service Bureau, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 842, 852-53, 484 P.2d
953, 959, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785, 791 (1971).

35. State of Cal. v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 588 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1978).
36. See, e.g., Hoffman, Antitrust Standing: Congress Responds to Illinois Brick, 1978 VAsH.
U.L.Q. 529 (1978); Tyler, PrivateAntitrust Litigation: The Problem of Standing, 49 U. COLO. L.
Rav. 269 (1978); Comment, Closing the Door on ConsumerAntitrust Standing, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv.
237 (1977); Comment, Antitrust-ClaytonAct Section 4-Standing, 7 U. BALT. L. REv. 328 (1978);
Comment, IllinoisBrick An Abuse ofPrecedentto Circumvent CongressionalIntent, 1977 UTAH L.
REv.501 (1977); Comment, DenialofStanding to Private,Non-commercialConsumers Under Section 4 0fthe ClaytonAct, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1531 (1978); Note 42, ALB. L. REV. 312 (1978); Recent
Decisions, 13 GA. L. REv. 278 (1978); Recent Cases, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 875 (1977); Recent Developments, 23 VILL. L. REv. 381 (1978).

37. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 n.7 (1977).
38. See id. at 726.
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such an injury is essential to establish standing.39 Congress, however, is
permitted to create standing statutorily by declaring that certain types
of plaintiffs may assert their interest on the basis of certain injuries.'
In fact, the Illinois Brick Court impliedly invited the federal legislature
to broaden standing if it so desired.41
It is unclear whether state legislatures were included in the Court's
invitation to expand standing, but the suggestion of one well regarded
authority is that federal standing regulations are promulgated pursuant
to federal control of thefederal judiciary. Consequently, federal standing regulations should not restrict state control of state judicial systems.42 It would seem, therefore, that the California Legislature can
constitutionally expand the class of injured parties in a state antitrust
action.43
The relatively permissive standing requirements in California open
the courtroom doors to those who otherwise would have been foreclosed from suit by IllinoisBrick. The United States Supreme Court in
Illinois Brick discussed several obstacles to broad standing with which
44
California must deal due to amendment of the Cartwright Act.
Before suggesting ways for California to resolve potential problems
emanating from broad remote purchaser standing, the obstacles to and
policy considerations behind the federal denial of broad standing must
be examined.
D.

Rationalefor Standing Restrictions-Proofas a Leitmotif
The United States Supreme Court articulated two bases upon which
to reject remote purchaser standing. Primarily, the Court stated that
allowing a remote purchaser plaintiff to claim that an injury was passed
on to him, while denying defendants the right to prove that the injuries
alleged by direct purchaser plaintiffs had in fact been passed on to
others, would subject defendants to an unreasonable threat of multiple
liability.45 In addition, Justice White's majority opinion stated that allowing remote purchasers to allege injury would so complicate proof
39. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1970).
40. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,

153 (1970).
41. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736, 746 (1977).
42. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 81 (1978).
43. The statutory conferment of standing does not altogether remove the issue of standing
from antitrust suits in federal court. There, a determination of sufficient injury for standing still
rests on the allegation of a case or controversy, as well as a finding that the plaintiff stood in the
zone of interests intended to be protected by the statute. Association of Data Processing Service

Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 152-53. Even given a congressional extension of standing
to a certain class of plaintiffs, the federal courts have required in addition, adequate allegations of
factual injury to the plaintiff in question. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).

44. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
45. 431 U.S. at 730.
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and atomize the damage award that prosecution of treble damage actions would become onerously complex and financially unrewarding.
Thus, private enforcement of the antitrust laws would be eviscerated. 6
Both of these bases echo a single theme: proof.
The belief that the pass-on doctrine involves insurmountable
problems of proof is evident in an examination of the first basis for
barring pass-on: the possibility of multiple liability. Multiple liability
would result from a policy of permitting recovery for the same passedon injury by plaintiffs at different levels of the distributive chain. The
Court, in Illinois Brick, consistently turns to Hanover Shoe and stare
decisis to support the denial of the defensive use of the pass-on concept,47 and having excluded the possibility of overturning Hanover
Shoe,48 declares offensive, unilateral use of the pass-on concept to be a
vehicle for multiple recovery. 49 The Court also stresses the references
made in HanoverShoe to the complexities of proof associated with defensive pass-on, 50 and interprets these complexities as the justification
for rejection of the concept. 5 Thus, while the holding in Hanover with
regard to defensive pass-on may have reflected a disinclination to allow
a defendant to employ a complicated scheme of proof to escape liability,52 Illinois Brick transforms the holding into a declaration that the
pass-on concept involves proof problems that courts should not even
attempt to master. This is so regardless of whether the concept is employed to deny recovery to direct purchasers allowing them to evade
punishment or to permit recovery by remote purchasers and thus to
impose punishment.
An analysis of the second basis for the rejection of pass-on-that it
destroys the effectiveness of private treble damage action suits-again
finds problems of proof at the root of the holding. The Court simply
asserts, without explanation,5 3 that complexities of pass-on proof make
litigation ineffective. The argument that allowance of pass-on begets
complexity of proof, that complexity of proof increases litigant ex46. Id. at 741.

47. Id. at 736-37, 744-45.
48. Id. at 736.

49. Id. at 730.
50. Id. at 731-32. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493
(1968).
51. See 431 U.S. at 732-33.
52. This was respondent's argument. Id. at 732-33. Several federal cases decided after Hanover Shoe and prior to Illinois Brick held that the HanoverShoe denial of pass-on applied only to
the defensive use of the doctrine. See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200 (9th
Cir. 1973); West Va. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 597 (N.D. IlI. 1973); Southern Gen. Builders v. Maule Indus.,

Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 74,484 (1972); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2
Trade Cases (CCH) 174,680 at 94,979 (1973).
53. 431 U.S. at 732.
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penses, and that increased expenses undermine the incentive to bring
suit is also advanced by the Court. 4 To this argument is added the
inferential leap that the use of pass-on necessitates division of the damage award among all injured parties5" regardless of the degree of injury
sustained.
The Court avers that even if proof were not an insurmountable obstacle to the use of pass-on, procedural mechanisms could not be expected to insure successful adjudication of the pass-on issue. 6 Illinois
Brick, therefore, was but one way of responding to problems of proof
and procedure inherent in antitrust fact patterns involving multiple
levels of injury distribution.
Since California has rejected the United States Supreme Court's solution to these problems, California courts must employ alternative solutions. The need to do so is amplified by the possibility that a growing
number of plaintiffs denied access to the treble damage authorization
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts will "rediscover" the Cartwright Act
and introduce to state courts the very complexities banished from federal courts by Illinois Brick.
APPROACHES TO PROOF OF PASSED-ON DAMAGES

With the isolation of proof as the fundamental problem area raised
by the use of the pass-on concept, a determination of workable methods of proof is the logical first step toward effective use of the concept.
Initially, the elements of proof must be specified; then means of adequately supporting these elements can be suggested.
As a general rule, an antitrust plaintiff must prove three elements in
order to recover: (1) an antitrust violation was committed by the defendant; (2) this violation was the proximate cause of an injury to the
plaintiff; and (3) the injury is measurable.5 7 Of these three elements,
the element of causation is peculiarly interwoven with the issue of
passed-on injury to remote purchasers. Proof of proximately caused
injury encompasses proof of both the existence and the extent of injury,58 which, because of the complexity inherent in antitrust litigation,
is dependent upon the use of economic tests and models as indicia of
the fact and degree of injury.
54. Id. at 737, 741-45.

55. This seems unlikely in view of the strict notice requirements imposed on class actions by
the holding in Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacqueln,417 U.S. 156, 176-79 (1974). The requirement that
all parties receive notice and that plaintiffs bear the costs of this notice should effectively prevent
suits wherein large numbers of plaintiffs seek awards that are severally minute. Id.
56. 431 U.S. at 738-41.
57. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 258 (1975).
58. Id. at 261-63; 16N J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND
TRADE REGULATION § 81.09 [5][a] (1978).
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A.

Econometrics

A suitable presumption that an injury was passed on might be established through any one of, or a combination of, three methods. The
first method of proof proposed to alleviate complexity relies on an
econometric theory that allows a plaintiff to avail himself of the wellrecognized analogy between the incidence of tax imposition and the
distribution of the effects of an overcharge caused by an antitrust violation.5 9 As used here, tax incidence connotes the analysis employed to
determine where the burden of a tax imposed on an entity actually
falls. For example, in the hypothetical used previously to demonstrate
the pass-on situation, suppose Monolithic Sugar had, instead of conspiring to fix prices, been subject to the imposition of a tax on sugar
production. As in the price fixing instance, Monolithic could either absorb the tax itself or raise commensurately the price it charges Compliant, thus passing on the incidence of that tax. If Monolithic did pass on
the tax incidence, Compliant would face a similar decision as to
whether to absorb the tax or pass it on to Hypoglize, and so on. As an
element of the final price of the candy, the tax is a factor which can be
considered "artifically imposed" instead of determined by market
forces.
Illegal overcharges, like taxes, are not inherent to integral determinants of market function such as supply and demand and are therefore
susceptible to tracing by the same methods applied to taxes. 60 After an
antitrust violation and an attendant overcharge have been proven, the
question of where the overcharge went and what parties it affected is at
the root of the pass-on issue. An econometric tax incidence approach
seeks to answer this question through the application of two assumptions. The first assumption is that commercial entities are motivated to
maximize profit.61 The logical inference drawn from this is that when a
commercial entity receives an overcharge as the result of an antitrust
violation, it will try to pass that overcharge on to the next link in the
chain of distribution to whatever extent necessary to avoid interference
with its maximization of profits.62 The second assumption is that the
success of the pass-on that the overcharged intermediary will inevitably
attempt is a factor of market conditions.63 These conditions are defined
by the elasticity of supply and demand and largely determine whether
59. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 224-30 (2d ed. 1973); Schaefer, Passing-On
Theory in Antitrust Treble DamageActions:An Economic andLegalAnalysis, 16 WM. & MARY L.
Rnv. 883 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Schaefer].
60. See generally Schaefer, supra note 59.
61. Id. at 901.
62. Id. at 895-96.
63. Id. at 887.
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the customers of the intermediary will pay an increased price and thus
accept the passed-on overcharge or will refuse to do so and leave the
intermediary with his injury.'
Application of econometric theory to the hypothetical employed here
may provide some concrete illustration. Monolithic Sugar has committed its overcharge and has been sued by Compliant, Hypoglize, and
some local consumers who purchased candy from Hypoglize. The
question is: who paid the overcharge? The answer is supplied by examination of the market conditions. Assume, for the sake of simplicity,
that the demand for sugar is totally inelastic, that is, that it will remain
at a certain level regardless of what price is charged. The first assumption of econometric tax incidence theory suggests that Compliant and
Hypoglize want to maximize their profits and consequently will, to the
greatest extent possible, avoid using their profits to pay for the overcharge. From the profit-maximization point of view, the optimum response to an increase in expenditures is to pass it on to someone else.
Thus Compliant will in all probability try to make Hypoglize pay for
the increase caused by Monolithic's violation, and Hypoglize will likewise want candy consumers to pay higher prices to insure that its profits are not consumed by the passed-on overcharge. From this it could
not be shown that the remote purchasers, Hypoglize and the consumers, actualy paid for the overcharge, only that Compliant would have
attempted to make them pay for it. Whether or not Compliant succeeded is, according to the second assumption, determined by market
factors. With the totally inelastic demand for sugar given here, Compliant can raise the price of its sugar without experiencing any decline
in sales; demand is static and Hypoglize will pay the higher price.
Thus, the first assumption tells us that Compliant would pass on the
overcharge if it could; the second, applied with regard to the particular
facts in this case (inelastic demand for sugar), tells us that Compliant
could pass on the overcharge.
Once these two assumptions have been articulated, they require support. The assumption of profit maximization by entities simply reiterates a fundamental principle of the capitalist system of economics.65
Yet this assumption, among others, has been cited as a weakness in the
tax incidence econometric approach by the opponents of the pass-on
doctrine.66 In California, the assumption should be considered entirely
64. Id.
65. See A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 194 (1776) reprintedin 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1952); P. ASCH, EcoNOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 101 (1970). "There is at present, no single
alternative hypothesis that gives us a more useful general approach." Id.
66. For an example, see 431 U.S. at 742.
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legitimate because it is inherent in other traditionally recognized methods of antitrust damages proof.67 Futher persuasion for acceptance lies
in the observation that profit maximization has been granted judicial
recognition as an accurate assumption in a Ninth Circuit holding.68
Support for the second fundamental assumption of the tax incidence
approach to proof of pass-on-that market conditions determine
whether the pass-on can be actually accomplished-is drawn mainly
from basic economic analysis. 69 If demand for a particular item is inelastic, that is, stable despite price increases,70 there is a very high
probability that the overcharged intermediary will add the overcharge
to the amount he usually charges his customers.71 If demand is elastic,
that is, unstable due to price increases, the intermediary will probably
be forced to sustain the injury of overcharge himself because passing
on the injury by increasing the price will reduce demand. 72 The converse of this analysis applies to supply. 73 Inelastic supply with regard
to a given product greatly weighs against the chances of damages being
passed on, while elastic supply creates a situation where the intermediary is very likely to pass his overcharge on and preserve his profit margin.7 4 These maxims are grounded on the assumption of total elasticity
of supply and demand. As a result, they postulate total retention or
total pass-on of damages. While this result would probably follow only
in such a hypothetical market, the basic theories remain valid when
adjusted to reflect accurately realistic market conditions. While there
seems to be no express judicial approval of tax incidence theory in the
realm of antitrust, it seems as accurate and probative as other tests
which currently enjoy judicial recognition.
B.

Conventional Tests

Econometric tax incidence analysis could be used to raise a rebuttable presumption of passed-on injury and could thus supplement two
more conventional methods of antitrust damages proof: the "beforeafter" test and the "yardstick" test. The "before-after" test simply com67. Schaefer, supra note 59, at 901.
68. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 812 (9th Cir. 1976).
69. See generally P. AscH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA (1970).

70. Id. at 139-40.
71. Id. at 141.

72. Id. at 139.
73. Schaefer, supra note 59, at 891.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 893; See P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 189-91 (1978); Cf. 16N J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 110.01 [1] n.1 (1978) (The
purpose of economic evidence in antitrust cases is to indicate what is likely to result from a given
economic situation).
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pares prices or performance levels prior to the time of the alleged violation with those after, makes a reasonable allowance for market
conditions, and determines whether or not damage was sustained.7 6

The "yardstick" test compares prices and performance levels of the
plaintiffs with those of similarly situated commercial entities who were
allegedly not affected by the violation. 77 Both tests currently play wellestablished roles in the detection of injuries caused by antitrust violations, 78 and they may be joined with econometric tax incidence theory
to offer remote plaintiffs three approaches to damage proof.
C. Toward a Truer Reflection of Economic Reality
The theories of proof advanced here are not radically innovative, yet
the United States Supreme Court has expressed skepticism regarding
the use of economic models as indicators of damage in both of its assessments of the pass-on concept. 79 The "yardstick" and the "beforeafter" theories were evidently spared the disapproving eye of the Court,
possibly because of their wide acceptance. The tax incidence theory
did not escape criticism by the Court, perhaps because no case law directly endorses its use in antitrust cases. The Court relegated a fairly
comprehensive discussion of the use of tax incidence in tracing antitrust damages to a footnote,80 preferring to indict the two essential assumptions supporting this theory as part of a general criticism of
economic models. 8 ' It has already been observed that the profit maximization assumption, while disdained as "convenient" in Illinois
Brick,82 is judicially accepted in the Ninth Circuit8 3 and could be accorded respect in California courts. The suspicion of the Court with
regard to the second assumption, that market conditions are the main
determinant of an economic entity's ability to pass on an overcharge,
suggests that it may not be as readily acceptable. The Court's reluctance to embrace this assumption does not deny that market conditions
in fact determine how a commercial entity will respond to overcharge
losses. It may reflect fear that all determinate market factors will not
be accounted for in the courtroom and that those presented will lack
76. See, e.g., Bigelow v RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 258 (1946); Pacific Coast
Agric. Export Assn. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1975).
77. See, e.g., Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 1951);
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1955).
78. Lanzillotti, Problems of Proof qfDamagesin Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 329,
330-32 (1971); Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANTITRUST
BULL. 497 (1972).

79. 431 U.S. at 742-43; 392 U.S. at 492-93.
80.
81.
82.
83.

431 U.S. at 74142 n.25.
Id. at 741-42.
Id. at 742.
Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 812 (9th Cir. 1976).
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sufficient fidelity to real-world transactions.84 The Court suggests that
alleged symptoms of a pass-on may be caused by some market force
which has been overlooked or intentionally omitted by the plaintiffY5
The validity of an economic model used to prove pass-on depends on
the extent to which it accurately represents all significant market factors; this necessarily injects a considerable degree of complexity into
the proceedings. Since the tax incidence theory, which is posited as a
solution to the problems of complexity attendant to the proof of passon, can only be accurately employed by the inclusion of significant
market factors, the proponent of pass-on faces a dilemma. He must
either sacrifice accuracy to reduce complexity or smother in complexity
in order to secure an accurate model of economic conditions. This apparent dilemma may be escaped through the use of a tool well suited to
management of the informational complexities endemic in modem society. That tool is the computer.

D. The Computer- A Truer Reflection of Reality Is Brought Into
Focus
In no field of the law has the computer been more avidly used than
in the field of antitrust.8 6 Computers are recognized to be of great utility because of their capacity to evaluate and summarize complex, voluminous data accurately and rapidly. 7 Since complex and voluminous
data are inherent in antitrust litigation generally 8 and in determination of passed-on injury specifically, 89 the computer is an appropriate
tool to ease proof of pass-on. The potential of the computer to clarify,
however, is equalled by its ability to deceive and obfuscate, 90 in part
because laymen are generally unfamiliar with its operation.9 1 Thus
special attention must be given to establishing a foundation of reliability for the particular computer employed. This would generally entail
both proof of accurate entry of data into the system and accurate
processing of data through the system. 92 Once this general foundation
is laid, specific evidentiary problems arise, depending on the use of the
84. See 431 U.S. 741-42.

85. Cf. id. at 742-43 (In this part of the opinion, the Court expresses its belief that "real
world" economic variables are too great to be managed).
86. D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.04 (1978).
87. BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION

§ 2.717 (1978).

88. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 85-86 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

232 (1976).
89. 431 U.S. 732-33.
90. BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.714 (1978).

91. Id.
92. E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 734 (2d ed. 1971).
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evidence. The evidence problems must be satisfied before the computer can be used to its full potential in order to alleviate the complex-

ity of proof.
Computerized evidence could be offered to prove pass-on behavior
directly in the form of summaries of the business records of each entity

in the chain of distribution from initial overcharge to remote purchaser.
Turning to the Monolithic sugar hypothetical, Hypoglize or the local
consumers might wish to prove an unreasonable variation of prices
charged over a period of time. This could be accomplished with a com-

puterized summary of the records maintained by Compliant and Monolithic over a period of several months. Such a summary would convey

the concept of an overcharge much more effectively than serial examination of each record. Business records are statements made out of

court, and as such would be excluded hearsay93 but for the exception to
the hearsay rule that is granted to records kept in the usual course of
business. 94 The plaintiff seeking to prove pass-on with the computerized summaries of business records that are advocated here faces another hurdle on the way to admissibility: the best evidence rule. The

best evidence rule imposes a general evidential requirement that all

records introduced in a court action be originals. 95 Fortunately, the
California Evidence Code permits admission of summaries in the place
of evidence which is too voluminous in its original state to be used
effectively in litigation.9 6 Consequently, it is possible to abate greatly

the complexity of pass-on proof with this type of business records summary.
A second probable use of the computer's data managing resources
may be seen in the application of the tax incidence theory of

econometrics. It will be recalled that one element of this theory is concerned with the determination of whether market conditions allowed
the pass-on of illegal overcharges, and one objection to the use of this
93. Id. at 584.
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271.
95. Id. § 1500.
96. Id. § 1509. Specifically, the provisions of this section state that a summary will not be
rendered inadmissible by the best evidence of a writing rule if the summary consists of numerous
accounts or other writings that could only be examined in court at the expense of a great deal of
time. It is also required that the evidence which may be sought from such a summary is limited to
the general result of the summary, and that the records upon which it is based be available for
inspection by the opposing party. A combination of the business records exception to the hearsay
rule and the exception granted by Section 1509 to summaries was employed to good effect in
Exclusive Florists,Inc., v. Kann, 17 Cal. App. 3d 711, 713-16, 95 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1971). This
case, while not concerned with antitrust violations, was one in which the plaintiff faced the
problems posed by voluminous business records. The court ruled that if business records were
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, they could be summarized for
the purposes of trial. The admissibility of this summarization, the court noted, was dependent
only upon the admissibility of the records, and did not require that the records had actually been
entered into evidence.
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theory is based on the complexity of the factors that comprise market
conditions.97 While the computer could summarize these various factors accurately and rapidly, the resulting summary would have to be
prepared specifically for litigation, and consequently would clearly not
qualify as a business record for exemption from the hearsay rule. 98
Computerized surveys of market conditions, therefore, would be most
easily employed as a basis for the testimony of an expert witness. The
evidence upon which an expert rests his opinion need not be admissible, so long as it is of a type "that reasonably may be relied upon by an
expert in forming his opinion." 99 After evaluating a summary of mar-

ket conditions, an expert may testify as to the degree of probability that
overcharges would be passed-on in such conditions. In addition, evidence otherwise inadmissible may be admitted as corroboration of expert testimony under the exception to the hearsay rule implied in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G W. Thomas Drayage& Rigging Co. 1I

0

In light of the potential of the computer, the task of following the labyrinthine path of passed-on damages is facilitated for California courts.
E. Burdens of Proof

Once methods of proving that the effect of an antitrust violation has
been passed on have been suggested, the question of the attendant burdens of proof arises. Here the distinction between proving the existence
of passed-on damages and proving the extent of such damages must be
made. Of the two, proof of existence presents the primary obstacle.' 0 '
The soundest attack that may be launched against the use of an economic test is that the plaintiff's symptoms of damage are caused by
alternative factors unaccounted for by the model employed. 0 2 If, after
inclusion of all pertinent economic factors and reduction of these factors to a manageable form by computers, an attack suggesting an alternate cause of the plaintiffs injury is raised, the defendant should bear
the burden of proving that the unaccounted-for factor was the actual
cause of the plaintiffs injury. This follows from the well-established
principle that the plaintiff in an antitrust suit need not disprove each
explanation of the cause of his damages which is opposed to his own
97. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
98. CAL.Evm. CODE § 1271.
99. Id. § 801.
100. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 42-43, 442 P.2d 641, 647, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 567 (1968).
101. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 558-59 (1931);
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfiord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir. 1957).
102. See Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492-93. See also
Lombino & Sons, Inc. v. Standard Fruit & Steamship Co., 1975-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 60,527
(1975) (where a price chart was found to be nonprobative because of omissions).
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reasonable explanation. °3 Should a denial of pass-on be raised by a
litigating intermediary distributor instead of the defendant, it is only
fitting that the distributor bear the burden of proving that damages
were not passed on, for he has the superior access to his business
records.
The plaintiff faces a lighter burden with regard to proof of the extent
of passed-on damages than that imposed on him when he attempts to
prove their very existence. 104 He can resort to the same methods of
proof used to establish pass-on and, prior to trial, is aided by the California case law provision that he need not itemize his damages in his
pleading.'
A jury may base an award on reasonable and just estimates, and a defendant is not allowed to object to a certain degree of
is respeculation as to the amount of damages when such speculation
06
actions.
own
his
by
bred
uncertainty
quired in the face of
Having demonstrated the feasibility of simplified proof through use
of the computer, it is now possible to discuss the application of the
computer to the problem of multiple liability.
IMPACT OF SIMPLIFIED PROOF ON MULTIPLE LIABILITY

A.

The Potentialof SimplNed Proof

Lest the picture just painted seem all too dark for the interests of the
defense bar, it must be remembered that access to computerized
econometric analysis is available to defendants as well. These substantive solutions to proof problems have been presented because of their
potential to locate the actual incidence of antitrust injury, and, to the
extent that they are workable, they reduce the threat of multiple liability faced by defendants by indicating where injury did not fall. Concerns over complexities of proof underlay both the Illinois Brick denial
of offensive pass-on to plaintiffs and the Hanover Shoe denial of defensive pass-on to defendants. 10 7 Mastery of these complexities will benefit both sides of the dispute. Since California statutorily allows a
remote purchaser to prove that his injury was passed on to him, so it
should shield a violator from liability to those who in fact passed on an
injurious overcharge and thus escaped damage. Consistent with this
philosophy, the recent amendment of the Cartwright Act provides re103. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 811 (9th Cir. 1976).
104. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946).
105. Overland Pub. Co. v. H.S. Crocker Co., 193 Cal. 109, 121, 222 P. 812, 817 (1924).
106. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir. 1964); Speegle v. Board of Fire
Underwriters of the Pac., 29 Cal. 2d 34, 46, 172 P.2d 867, 874 (1946); A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 398-99 (2d ed. 1970).

107. See notes 44-53 and accompanying text supra.
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' 8 Clearly
covery to those injured "infact."'
a plaintiff who has passed
on the injury is not "injured in fact" and should not recover under the
new law. Reason suggests that California's rejection of Illinois Brick
has simultaneously lifted the restrictions placed on the defensive use of
pass-on by Hanover Shoe. Whether or not "reason" shall prevail in
this area ultimately must be determined by the bench and bar of the
state.

B.

Procedural4nsivers to the Limitations of Simpl ed Proof

The efficacy of the approach to proof outlined here, a means of accurately tracing pass-on to permit recovery while preventing multiple liability, rests on the assumption that all parties needed to adjudicate the
issues are in court. This assumption must now be fleshed out through
the use of the procedural approaches best suited to including all needed
parties in the litigation and the requirement that the defendant be
shielded from multiple liability.
The threat of multiple liability against which the United States
Supreme Court erected standing barriers is suggested by two legal configurations. Some potential defendants have grounds and claim injury
but have not yet filed suit while other defendants may be pressing their
claims. Those interested parties not yet litigating may be joined under
California law if they have an interest in a series of transactions that
raise common questions of law or fact and involve joint, several, or
alternative claims.' 0 9 This permissive joinder may be augmented by
the provision which authorizes the court, in its discretion, to compel
joinder of parties necessary for a just resolution of litigation. 110 There
is apparently no case law directly on point, but in an action where each
link in the chain of distribution must be scrutinized to determine
whether pass-on occurred, each is arguably a necessary party required
for just resolution of the litigation. Use of these devices would assure
that nonlitigants who pose a potential threat of multiple liability to the
defendant by virtue of their ability to bring subsequent suit would be
included in a single action where their claims can be consistently evaluated.
There are other devices available to assure inclusion of parties simultaneously litigating the pass-on issue in other actions in a single resolution of the issues. Joinder of a party outside an antitrust suit who is
asserting an interest in recovery for the same passed-on overcharge being litigated in that suit can be compelled on the grounds that his exclu108.

109.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 378.

110. Id.§389.
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sion would "leave any of the persons already parties subject to
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations .
,
This provision readily applies to the typical passon situation.
Should other antitrust injury claimants threaten final adjudication of
the pass-on issue by bringing separate actions simultaneously, additional procedures buttress joinder in California. Where multiple liability is threatened by suits in different courts, two procedural devices are
available. Case consolidation may be employed when common questions of law or fact predominate, 12 as they clearly would when multiple parties claim damages from the same passed-on overcharge. In
addition, transfer may be employed to combine 1litigants
in situations
3
promoted."'
be
would
justice
of
"ends
the
where
Once all litigants have been included, defendants may avail themselves of yet another procedural device; California authorizes interpleader,' 14 a procedure by which a defendant may escape multiple
claims by waiving his interest in the amount of the overcharge he is
alleged to have retained and, in essence, forcing the various claimants
to adjudicate their interests without him. 15 Arguments favoring interpleader as a remedy to multiple liability on the federal level failed to
impress the majority in the Illinois Brick decision."I6 Federal law requires that the interpleading defendant post a bond to secure his liability117 and the high Court observed that this requirement would, in the
face of the titanic potential liability in treble damges cases, 118 effectively deny the defendant's recourse to interpleader. 119 California
courts need not be bound by this interpretation for two reasons. The
Supreme Court overlooked the federal statutory provision that the
bond posted need not reflect the total liability of the defendant and
120
need only be an amount regarded as sufficient by the trial judge.
While the California statute authorizing interpleader has no identical
provision, a comparable subsection of the statute allows the defendant
to surrender only a portion of his interest in the alleged damages if he
111. Id.
112. Id. §404.

113. Id. § 397(3).
114. Id. § 386.
115. Id.
116. 431 U.S. at 731 N.11.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976).
118. For example, see Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258, 363-64 (1973) rev'd in part,
Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 555 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1977) (damages of $260,000,000) and West
Va. v. Chas. Pfzer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 734 (1970) (damages of $79,557,269).
119. 431 U.S. at 738 n.20.

120. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2) (1976).
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so chooses. 12 1 This provision gives the alleged violator of California

antitrust laws a considerable degree of flexibility in determining to
what extent he must post security. Without the limitations that
prompted the Illinois Brick court to reject federal interpleader as an
effective shield against multiple liability, California interpleader may
be relied upon by besieged violators to ensure nonduplicative damage
awards.
The import of the devices outlined above is that they offer methods
through which litigants may be brought into the same suit and subjected to factfinding through the methods of proof suggested in this
comment. These joinder devices are essential to the effective use of
other proof methods to insure full, fair, and final litigation. There remains, however, a gap in this combined system of proof and procedure
through which multiple liability may yet intrude. A great many antitrust cases reach settlement before trial.' 22 The proof methods and procedures advanced here protect defendants only from multiple
judgments; they do not prevent plaintiffs from bludgeoning a defending
into a pretrial settlement and leaving him at the mercy of other similarly inclined plaintiffs. Two considerations may help contract this aperture in California law. In situations where claimants push their case
to court, prior settlements arguably would be entitled to recognition
under the judicial use of equitable lien "23
' and serve as a shield to the
defendant who, in good faith, erroneously compensated an out-of-court
claimant for damages sustained by an in-court plaintiff. More
pragmatically, the likelihood of a settlement characterized by the extortion of excessive damages is largely a function of the magnitude of the
threat perceived by the defendant in the impending litigation. To the
extent that proof becomes less complex and litigation becomes less of a
nightmare, a defendant need no longer be intimidated by litigation
solely because of its inconvenience. Thus the potential for "civil extortion" diminishes, and California may be viewed as a forum with adequate means to thwart multiple liability.
THE PERIPHERAL PROBLEM OF FRACTURED DAMAGES

While the threat of multiple liability was incontestably the major
consideration behind the Illinois Brick denial of remote purchaser recovery in antitrust cases, 24 it did not stand alone. A secondary, almost
121. CAL. CwV. PROC. CODE § 386.
122. Renfrew, Negotiation andJudicialScrutiny of Setlements in Civil and CriminalAntitrust
Cases, 70 F.R.D. 495, 495-96 n.1 (1976).
123. See Case Note, 55 J. OF URB. L. 409, 427 (1978).

124. See 431 U.S. at 730-48.

1979 / Antitrust

incidental rationale was the fear that remote standing would destroy
the incentive to sue.12 5 This is because one justification for authorization of treble damage suits is the incentive they provide to private actions as a means of antitrust enforcement. 126 Allowing all injured
parties to sue would, the Court suggested, so divide the award into insignificant amounts among each injured party that it would no longer
entice the private suits so vital to antitrust enforcement. 7 If direct or
remote purchasers anticipate smaller awards they may have less incentive to sue in the face of the burden of bringing suit. To a great extent,
the goal of this comment has been to suggest that in California the
burdens of bringing suit can be lightened through simplified proof and
procedural devices. The advantages of simplified methods of proof
must be weighed by each litigant against the likelihood of a reduced
award due to fracturing of damages. Even the United States Supreme
Court noted that its contention that great numbers of claimants would
fracture awards was of questionable validity. "It is unlikely," conceded
Justice White in the Illinois Brick majority opinion, "that all potential
plaintiffs could or would be joined."' 28
Having acknowledged that some remote claimants who had sustained inconsequential injury would lack interest to sue, 129 the opinion
returns to play the tune of "the difficulty of ascertaining the amount
absorbed by any particular indirect purchaser."130 Apparently, the
Court did not feel that the fracturing of damages among remote purchasers was as great a factor in the mitigation of private suit effectiveness as were the problems of complex litigation. In addition, direct
purchasers are often unlikely plaintiffs because of business considerations. The direct purchaser may in fact be a subsidiary of the violator,
and as such, would not be inclined to sue the parent. 13 ' Even when the
direct purchaser is an independent entity, his interests in maintaining a
generally favorable relation with the supplier will often dissuade him
from "rocking the boat."' 32 The direct purchaser is not likely to play a
significant role in fracturing damages, and it is probable that damage
awards will be substantially maintained. The incentive of substantial
awards, therefore, is still likely to outweigh the reduced tribulations of
trial in the eyes of those remote purchasers who have been significantly
injured by the passed-on effects of a violation of the Cartwright Act.
See id. at 745-48.
Id.
See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
431 U.S. at 739.
Id. at 747 n.31.
Id.at 747.
131. S.REP. No. 934, 95TH CONrG., 2D SESS., 18 (1977).
132. Id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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CONCLUSION

Depending on one's point of view, California courts have been
blessed with.the opportunity or saddled with the onus of determining
antitrust damages along the entire chain of commercial distribution.
This adjudication can be made, not with simplicity, but with greater
facility by adopting certain methods of proof to determine substantive
issues and employing currently existing rules of procedure to ensure
full, nonredundant litigation of the incidence of damage. While legislation may be of some value to provide statutory authority for certain
methods of proof, the resources needed to meet whatever challenge the
litigation of passed-on damages is apt to present are within reach.
When faced with the adjudication of remote purchaser antitrust claims,
the United States Supreme Court could only ease the complexity inherent in such suits by procedurally excluding remote claimants. California's recent statutory amendment allows our courts to determine the
claim of remote purchasers on the merits, and to determine those merits through economic analysis.

Blane A. Smith

